BACKGROUND: Emerging transfusion-transmissible pathogens, including arboviruses such as West Nile, Zika, dengue, and Ross River viruses, are potential threats to transfusion safety. The most prevalent arbovirus in humans in Australia is Ross River virus (RRV); however, prevalence varies substantially around the country. Modeling estimated a yearly risk of 8 to 11 potentially RRV-viremic fresh blood components nationwide. This study aimed to measure the occurrence of RRV viremia among donors who donated at Australian collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission during one peak season.
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: Plasma samples
were collected from donors (n 5 7500) who donated at the selected collection centers during one peak season. Viral RNA was extracted from individual samples, and quantitative reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction was performed.
RESULTS:
Regions with the highest rates of RRV transmission were not areas where donor centers were located. We did not detect RRV RNA among 7500 donations collected at the selected centers, resulting in a zero risk estimate with a one-sided 95% confidence interval of 0 to 1 in 2019 donations.
CONCLUSION:
Our results suggest that the yearly risk of collecting a RRV-infected blood donation in Australia is low and is at the lower range of previous risk modeling. The majority of Australian donor centers were not in areas known to be at the highest risk for RRV transmission, which was not taken into account in previous models based on notification data. Therefore, we believe that the risk of RRV transfusion transmission in Australia is acceptably low and appropriately managed through existing risk management, including donation restrictions and recall policies. E merging pathogens are a threat to blood supply safety. 1 Arthropod-borne viruses, or arboviruses, are well recognized as emergent in many regions around the globe. Given that arboviral infection has the potential to cause disease in humans and that infection results in a period of asymptomatic viremia, there exists a risk of transmission through blood transfusion. 2 Arboviruses, including West Nile virus (WNV) and dengue virus (DENV), are well recognized threats to global blood supply safety [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ; and others, including Zika virus (ZIKV) and Ross River virus (RRV), have emerged as a risk in more recent times. 7, 8 potential for its global emergence. 10 The majority of infections (50%-75%) in humans do not result in symptoms. When symptoms do occur, they are usually mild; however, they can include a nonfatal arthritogenic condition known as RRV disease. 14 20 and the risk of collecting a RRVinfected donation in higher risk areas of Australia after increased rainfall estimated to be in the range from 1 in 2497 to 1 in 58,284 donations. 24 However, in 2014, a probable case of RRV transfusion transmission occurred from a donor who donated before developing symptoms. 8 Subsequent modeling estimated a yearly risk of 8 to 11 potentially RRV-viremic fresh blood components. 26 To help maintain blood safety in Australia, individuals diagnosed with RRV are ineligible to donate while they are unwell and for 4 weeks after their symptoms end. As an additional safety precaution, donors are instructed to notify the Australian Red Cross Blood Service (Blood Service) if they become unwell in the 7 days after donation or if they are diagnosed with a serious illness within 2 months of donation. This may result in the quarantine or recall of a blood component, depending on the condition. For RRV infection, components are recalled if they were manufactured from a donor who notified the Blood Service of the development of RRV symptoms in the 4 weeks before or after donation. This duration is expected to adequately cover the viremic period using conservative assumptions.
The probable case of RRV transfusion transmission resulted in enhanced donor education focused on the reporting of post-donation illness. 8 Due to the aforementioned case of probable RRV transfusion transmission, 8 we sought to measure the rate of RRV viremia among donors who donated at collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission during one period of active transmission. This was required to provide empirical data to supplement our risk modeling, because the rate of RRV viremia in blood donors was unknown.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Identification of regions with high rates for RRV transmission and selection of "at-risk" areas , were used to rank areas' risk for RRV transmission based on these historical data per 100,000 inhabitants. Areas were ranked from highest to lowest risk for RRV transmission and were assessed to determine whether a blood donor center was close enough to enable the collection of a significant number of donations from that area. We selected the top ten Blood Service Donor Centers based on a higher level of risk of the SA3s where they are located: Albany, Bunbury, Darwin, Gladstone, Mildura, Nambour, Rockhampton, Rockingham, Strathpine, and Townsville. Areas with lower or no risk were not included; and, for logistical reasons, only fixed donor centers were included in this study. Because RRV has seasonal variability, samples were collected during "higher risk" months. The month of March appeared to have higher rates of RRV in the Northern Territory and Queensland, 27, 28 and this was confirmed by notification data demonstrating a notification peak in March (data available from: http://www9. health.gov.au/cda/source/rpt_3.cfm); therefore, collections commenced during this month for all donor centers ( Fig. 1 ).
Geographic information system mapping
To visualize whether blood donors resided in areas with significant RRV transmission, the average RRV notifications per 100,000 inhabitants and in each year (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) were mapped with the yearly average number of blood donors between 2011 and 2015 at the SA3 level.
The map enables an understanding of the spatial patterns of RRV notifications. All geographic layers were processed using ArcGIS 10.4 (Esri).
Sample size calculation
The theoretical risk of RRV transfusion transmission was estimated from population data as 1 in 4917 during the peak of an outbreak in Cairns in 2004. 20 Assuming a rate of viremia of 0.0203% (1 in 4917; estimated during the peak of the aforementioned outbreak), 20 testing approximately 7500 samples would give a 95% confidence interval from 0.0038 to 0.0368%, which was deemed acceptable and fundable. However, it is unlikely that such a rate will be uniform in all risk areas during the period targeted for collections; therefore, it was thought possible that no viremic donations would be found.
Sample collection
A dedicated study sample from blood donors was collected from a cross-section of all donors who donated at collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission between March 2 and April 9, 2015. Samples were collected in plasma preparation tubes (PPT) (BD Vacutainer PPT tubes) then centrifuged at 2500 rpm for 5 minutes according to routine procedures. All samples were de-identified and given a unique study number. Samples were stored at 2208C for up to 7 months until required.
RNA isolation
RNA was isolated from plasma (1 mL) from samples with an adequate volume (Albany, n 5 497; Bunbury, n 5 757; Darwin, n 5 763; Gladstone, n 5 701; Mildura, n 5 382; 31 and a strain isolated from the 2014 probable transfusion-transmitted case. 8 This assay was used to screen all samples (n 5 7500) in duplicate.
RT-PCR limit of detection estimate
The limit of detection for the RRV PCR assay was estimated using a low-concentration dilution series of DNA oligo (Sigma Aldrich) matching a 99-base-pair portion of the T48 sequence (GQ433359.1) and spanning the RRV PCR amplicon. Oligo concentration, having been independently quantified (Sigma Aldrich), was converted to concentration in copies of RRV genome equivalent/microliter using modified equations from the DNA copy number calculator provided by the University of Rhode Island Genomics and Sequencing Center (http://cels.uri.edu/gsc/ cndna.html). In total, 28 replicate measurements were generated for each DNA concentration from three independent experiments. The 95% detection limit of the assay was calculated by Probit analysis using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS version 23; IBM Australia Ltd.).
Statistical analysis
Data analysis was performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft Corporation). Exact confidence intervals were calculated for individual proportions (RRV RNA positivity) using a standard method. 32 
Ethical approval
Ethical approval was obtained from the Blood Service Human Research Ethics Committee.
RESULTS
The highest risk regions for RRV transmission, including regions with the seven highest rates, were not areas where blood donor centers were located nearby (ranging from 67 to thousands of kilometers away), and only small numbers of donors reside in many of these areas (Fig. 2) . The ten selected donor centers included in this study (Albany, Bunbury, Darwin, Gladstone, Mildura, Nambour, Rockhampton, Rockingham, Strathpine, and Townsville) were located within areas that had an average of greater than 60 cases notified each year per 100,000 inhabitants (Fig.  2) . Areas with an annual rate of 60 or fewer notified cases each year per 100,000 inhabitants were not targeted for this study, such as SA3s in Sydney and Melbourne. None of the 7500 samples from donors who donated at collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission were positive for RRV RNA, resulting in a zero risk estimate with a one-sided 95% confidence interval of 0 to 1 in 2019 donations. MS2 phage was detected in all 7500 samples, with the positive control detected in all individual RT-PCR plates. The 95% limit of detection of our in-house RT-PCR was estimated using a Probit analysis at between 8 and 12 copies/reaction (Table 1) , which equated to from 1 to 1.5 copies/mL. 
DISCUSSION
It has recently been demonstrated that RRV potentially is transmitted through blood transfusion. 8 This, together with the knowledge that ZIKV, WNV, and DENV can be transmitted through such a route, 3, 5, 7 highlights the potential concern posed by arboviruses to global blood transfusion safety. RRV transmission is highly seasonal, with a large degree of geographical variation. [21] [22] [23] [24] Transmission also varies yearly in any one region, although there are clear areas of increased transmission. Fortuitously for this study, during the year we collected samples (2015), there was a spike in RRV notifications, with 9551 cases (compared with an average of 4426 cases/year in the preceding 2 decades; www9.health.gov.au/cda/ source/rpt_2.cfm). The case definition for RRV changed in January 2016; before then, there was likely an overestimation of RRV cases (http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ main/publishing.nsf/Content/cda-surveil-nndss-casedefs-cd_rrv.htm). However, because previous years were subject to this same overestimation, the peak in the number of RRV notifications in 2015 compared with other years likely remains a valid phenomenon. The historical peak rate of RRV notifications occurred in March (based on notifications between 1992 and 2016; www9.health. gov.au/cda/source/rpt_3.cfm), when the majority of donation samples were collected. In this study, we targeted collections from blood donor collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission based on historical averages (defined as "at-risk"). RRV RNA was not detected in any of the 7500 donations collected from blood donors in such regions during one peak period of transmission in a major outbreak year, suggesting that the average nationwide yearly risk of collecting a RRV-infected donation is extremely low and at the lower range of previous risk modeling. 20, 26 Australia is a vast country with major population density around the coast, particularly on the east coast. The location of blood donor centers targets where adequate donors reside; therefore, the majority of Australia's sparsely populated land mass does not have a close-by, fixed donor center. When identifying donor centers for inclusion in this study, it was clear that the highest risk areas were in regions where no donor centers were located and where only small numbers of donors reside. This was encouraging for the management of RRV transfusiontransmission risk in Australia, because the risk does not depend on the prevalence in Australia but on the prevalence in donating blood donors, which may help to explain why our estimate herein was at the lower end of our previous risk modeling. 20, 26 This finding is not unexpected given the postulated transmission cycle, in which those exposed are more likely to be from rural or periurban areas in close proximity to native marsupials or non-marsupial reservoirs (including dogs, pigs, chickens, horses, and rats), which have been hypothesized to sustain endemic circulation, 19, 33 as opposed to densely populated urban areas not exposed to such transmission cycles. However, there are still areas of potential risk for RRV transmission where our donor centers and donors are located, including those donor centers selected for inclusion in this study. We previously documented potential risk-mitigation strategies that could maintain safety with respect to RRV. 8, 26 Other potential risk-reduction strategies for these areas with significant historical RRV transmission during seasons with increased transmission could include restriction to source plasma collections only, as is undertaken in response to DENV outbreaks in North Queensland, 6 or the use of pathogen inactivation, such as the THERAFLEX UV-Platelets system, which has been demonstrated to efficiently inactivate RRV spiked into buffy coat-derived platelet concentrates. 34 However, the former would likely result in sufficiency concerns, and the latter is not yet available for all blood components or approved for use in Australia. Moreover, the wide distribution of RRV and the time scales of reporting of cases mean that identifying such areas in real time and responding with local restrictions in an appropriate time frame would likely be impractical. 8 The findings in this study provide additional supportive evidence that further risk-mitigation strategies for the management of RRV transfusion transmission are not currently warranted. This study was undertaken in response to a probable case of RRV transfusion transmission from a presymptomatic, viremic donor. 8 Thus, it is imperative that staff in collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission, and indeed nationwide, remain vigilant in their communication with donors in relation to education and post-donation illness reporting, as we have previously recommended. 8 For transfused components that are recalled because of a RRV risk, the Blood Service notifies the recipients' treating clinician. In addition, we will generally consider testing the archive sample associated with the donation in the following circumstances: If the symptoms in the donor developed in the week after the donation and the associated component was transfused within the last 6 weeks (i.e., the recipient could be in the incubation period of RRV or in the early symptomatic period); If, when the clinician is notified, they request it to aid patient management; or If the recipient tests positive (usually they are tested because of a clinically compatible illness) after the notification to investigate transfusion transmission.
We do not test the archive sample if no components from at-risk donations have been transfused. In addition to the probable case of transfusion transmission, 8 we have identified one other RRV-viremic donation. The donor developed symptoms 1 day after donation but was not diagnosed until 1 month after donation; and, at that time, the red blood cells associated with the donation had been transfused. RRV RNA was detected in the donation sample by two in-house RT-PCR tests and was verified by sequencing at the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory. Transfusion transmission was excluded in the recipient, who tested negative by RRV serology and RRV RT-PCR 13 days after receiving the transfusion. Therefore, in Australia, there remains only one known probable case of RRV transfusion transmission. Similar to DENV, postulated reduced rates of infection may occur after parenteral exposure to a human-derived versus a cutaneous mosquito-derived inoculum, and this also decreases the risk of transfusion transmission. 35 The true transmission potential of a RRV-viremic donation is unknown but is less than 100%. Our study has several limitations. Due to the absence of a commercially available blood screening assay for RRV, we developed an in-house RT-PCR based on a diagnostic assay. First, we confirmed that this assay was able to detect different strains of RRV (including the prototype/ reference strain, 30 a mosquito isolate from 2007, 31 and an isolate from the recent probable RRV transfusion transmission in 2014 8 ); however, it is possible that there could be strains circulating that may not be detected by our assay. Similarly, although we optimized our assay to minimize the limit of detection (employing methodologies similar to those used for extracting free fetal DNA, 36 which circulates in the maternal blood stream at low concentrations), it is possible that our assay may not have detected all viremic individuals, especially those with low viral loads. There is limited knowledge about the magnitude of viremia in RRV-infected individuals, and there is no understanding of a threshold quantity of infectious RRV particles required for transfusion transmission. Investigating these paucities in our understanding could involve large-scale donor-recipient clinical studies, similar to those performed previously for other arboviruses. 37 Mouse studies suggest that viremia is at its highest 1 day after infection (23,820 copies/mL), persisting for 5 days in most cases (average, 37 copies/mL), but can be extended to 9 days at a low viral load (6 copies/mL) in some individuals. 20 The absence of an international standard for RRV RNA prevents an accurate comparison; however, it is encouraging that the limit of detection of our assay appears capable of detecting clinically significant viral loads. Arbovirus (DENV, WNV, and ZIKV) RNA may persist in whole blood longer than plasma, associated with red blood cells [38] [39] [40] ; whether this observation also occurs for RRV remains to be determined, and studies like those performed previously for other arboviruses [38] [39] [40] are required to answer this question. Although we targeted donors who donated at donor centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission during peak transmission, it is possible that RRV RNA-positive donors may have escaped our sampling approach. For logistical reasons, we were unable to question every donor about "at-risk" behaviors (such as numbers of mosquito bites, travel to highest risk regions, hours spent outside, etc.). Samples collected at mobile units were excluded from the study for logistical reasons, and it is possible that the level of risk in these collections may differ from the level in collections from static sites. However, mobile sites are only responsible for a small minority of collections and would not be expected to have a large proportional impact on the level of risk. Nonetheless, our data demonstrating no detection of RRV RNA in individuals donating in areas with significant RRV transmission is encouraging from a blood-safety perspective. Among 7500 donations collected from donors at collection centers located in areas with significant RRV transmission during one peak period of transmission during a major outbreak year, none had detectable RRV RNA. In addition, this study confirms predictions from spatial mapping that the majority of donor centers are not in areas documented to be at the highest risk for RRV transmission. Previous risk assessments failed to consider the location of collection centers relative to areas at higher risk of RRV transmission and thus may have overestimated the level of risk. 20, 26 In addition, the stringent donation restrictions in Australia (which were strengthened in response to the probable transfusion-transmitted case of RRV) and the donation recall system for postdonation reports of illness provide additional protection. These data suggest that the yearly risk of collecting a RRV-infected donation in Australia during higher risk periods is low and at the lower range of previous risk modeling. Our study provides supportive evidence that, because the likelihood of RRV transfusion transmission is low and RRV usually leads to only mild symptoms without significant morbidity or mortality, the risk of RRV transfusion transmission in Australia is tolerable and is managed appropriately through current Blood Service donation restrictions and recall policies. Monitoring of epidemiological data and international practice is ongoing, and this ensures an appropriate response to any changes in risk.
